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THE EFFICACY OF INDEFINITE
DETENTION: ASSESSMENT OF
IMMIGRATION CASE LAW IN KIYEMBA V.
OBAMA

HANSDEEP SINGH*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the doors of Guantanamo, the ultimate symbol of the
war on terror, begin to close, the government is faced with a
herculean task of prosecuting (within federal or military
tribunals), transferring, or releasing detainees it has held for
over seven years. Since 2002, there have been over 600
Guantanamo detainees who have been released or
transferred.1 Currently, of the 172 detainees that remain, sixty
are no longer designated enemy combatants or have no lawful
designation justifying continued detention.2
Within this group are seventeen Uighurs,3 Turkic
Muslims, who fled to Afghanistan from China because of
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1
News Release, Detainee Transfer Announced, U.S. Department of
Defense (Sept. 16, 2010).
2
John Wesley Hall, Withering Uighurs, 33-APR CHAMP 5 (2009).
Human Rights Watch, U.S. Indefinite Detention Authorized but Restricted
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/07/us-indefinitedetention-authorized-restricted.
3
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637.
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religious/ political persecution.4 After the 2002 bombings in
the Tora Bora region, they fled again to Pakistan where they
were subsequently turned over by bounty hunters to U.S.
forces.5 Even after eight years of detention and the Bush
administration's removal of the enemy combatant
designation, the fate of five Uighurs remains far from
settled.6
This note discusses the potential indefinite detention, also
called preventative detention, of the Uighur detainees.7 Until
early 2010, the U.S. Government had been unable to resettle
seventeen Uighurs for over 5 years.8 In 2009, the Supreme
Court, granted certiorari on the issue of whether federal
courts have the authority to ―order the release of prisoners
held at Guantanamo Bay 'where the Executive detention is
indefinite and without authorization in law, and release into
the continental United States is the only possible effective
remedy.‘‖9 However, on March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the case to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (hereinafter
―Circuit Court II‖) after each detainee had ―received at least
one offer of resettlement in another country.‖10
4

Mark Memmott, China Has Executed Nine Uighurs, NPR (Nov. 9,
2009), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2009/11/china_has_executed_nine_uighur.html (recently nine
Uighurs were executed in China for ethnic violence that was spurred by
government policies).
5
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
935637; Michael Price, Guantanamo Update, 33-NOV CHAMP 55
(2009) ($85,000 was the amount given for the 17 Uighurs).
6
Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. __(2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010) (per
curiam).
7
See generally In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp.
2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022
(D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
935637.
8
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555, F.3d 1022, 1033 n.2 (2009), vacated, 130
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637 (Rogers, J.
concurring).
9
Kiyemba v. Obama 559, U.S. __ (2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010).
10
Id.
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Although the Circuit Court II must now confront a new
question on whether a detainee who is denied an offer for
relocation can be released into the U.S, it will likely still have
to grapple with the lawfulness of either indefinitely detaining
or releasing petitioners into the U.S. As the petitioners have
contended in their most recent reply,11 ―there is no admissible
record evidence that there is, today, somewhere else to go.‖12
In this note, we will assume either the legitimacy of the
detainees‘ refusal to resettle or that such refusal has no
bearing on the detainees‘ right to be released in the U.S.13
Ultimately, this leaves the government with only two options:
(1) indefinite detention14 or (2) their release into the U.S.15
The initial grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court on Oct.
20, 2009 revealed the manifest importance of addressing this
issue, yet with the subsequent order to vacate and remand, the
implications of such policy still remain unsettled.16 Even with
the Supreme Court's attempt to avoid the fundamental
question of indefinite detention, they will likely have to
revisit this issue in the near future.17
This note will be limited to assessing the application of
Supreme Court immigration cases to Kiyemba by first laying
out the detailed procedural history. Legal arguments
presented between In re Guantanamo Detainee Litigation
(United States District Court, District of Columbia
(hereinafter ―District Court‖ )) and Kiyemba v. Obama
(United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (hereinafter ―Circuit Court I‖)) are examined next.
11

See generally Brief for Petitioner, Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 085424 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
12
Id. at 4 n.1.
13
Petitioner's argue that the remedy of the "Great Writ is not
transportation to a distant island." Id. at 13.
14
The government and the Circuit Court I used the more benign term
of ―harborage‖ to designate individuals who are unable to be released into
the U.S. and who are therefore currently being ―housed‖ in Guantanamo.
15
See Kiyemba v. Obama 559, U.S. __ (2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235
(2010) (discussing the issues before the Supreme Court prior to its
decision to vacate and remand).
16
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637.
17
Id.
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The Note then analyzes the relevant Supreme Court
immigration case law that formed the basis of the judgment
on merits used in both the District and Circuit Court I before
the most recent vacatur. Lastly, the Note concludes with a
potential solution or balanced measure that may
accommodate the sovereignty and liberty interests at stake.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY18
The Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority group, fled China
and lived in Uighur camps in Afghanistan and then
Pakistan.19 It was originally disputed whether these camps
were controlled by East Turkistan Islamic Movement
(hereinafter ―ETIM‖) and what role the Taliban had in
supporting these camps.20 Once the Uighurs were present in
Pakistan, local officials turned them over to Pakistani
officials.21 Subsequently, the Uighurs were turned over to the
U.S. military for $5,000 per individual.22
On July 29, 2005, Houzaifa Parhat and eight other
Uighurs sought habeas relief (Kiyemba v. Bush) from their
imprisonment in Guantanamo.23 The case was stayed pending
the resolution of Boumediene v. Bush.24 During the interim
period, Mr. Parhat filed a petition with the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals under the Detainee Treatment Act (hereinafter
―DTA‖). After the ruling in Boumediene on June 12, 2008,

18

See Center for Constitutional Rights, Kiyemba v. Obama:
Timeline, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/kiyemba-v.-bush
(last visited June 22, 2010) for more detail on the timeline and procedural
history.
19
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34-35
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
935637.
20
Id. at 38.
21
Id. at 35.
22
Id.
23
Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
24
Center for Constitutional Rights, Kiyemba v. Obama: Timeline,
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/kiyemba-v.-bush (last visited
June 22, 2010).
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the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided Parhat v. Gates.25
In this decision, the Court found that the designation of
―enemy combatant‖ as applied to petitioners was invalid and
ordered either the release, transfer, or new Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (hereinafter ―CSRT‖) to review the
evidence in light of the Court's opinion.
On July 10, 2008, all habeas petitions on behalf of the
seventeen Uighurs were consolidated as Kiyemba v. Bush
under the guidance of Judge Ricardo M. Urbina.26 Soon
thereafter on August 4, 2008, the government informed the
District Court that it would not convene a new CSRT for Mr.
Parhat.27 After multiple hearings with the government, Judge
Urbina ordered the release of the seventeen Uighur prisoners
on October 8, 2008.28 Immediately, the government sought an
emergency stay which the Circuit Court I granted the
following day.29 Eventually, the Circuit Court I granted a
stay pending expedited appeal where it reversed the district
court's decision on February 18, 2009.30 Petitioners
subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was
granted on October 20, 2009.31 On March 1, 2010, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the Circuit Court II
based on the offer of resettlement to each petitioner, arguing

25

In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 33, 34
(D.D.C. 2008).
26
Center for Constitutional Rights, Kiyemba v. Obama: Timeline,
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/kiyemba-v.-bush (last visited
June 22, 2010).
27
Id.
28
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
935637.
29
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555, F.3d 1022, 1024 n.2 (2009), vacated,
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. (Rogers, J.
concurring).
30
Center for Constitutional Rights, Kiyemba v. Obama: Timeline,
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/kiyemba-v.-bush (last visited
June 22, 2010).
31
Kiyemba v. Obama 559, U.S. __ (2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010)
(per curiam).
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that, ―[n]o court has yet ruled in this case in light of the new
facts, and we decline to be the first to do so.‖32
III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS: DISTRICT COURT VS. CIRCUIT COURT
A. District Court (Judge Ricardo M. Urbina): The Scope of
Executive Power Regarding ―Wind Up‖ Authority & the
Power to Exclude
Under In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, the
District Court held that: (1) continued detention exceeds the
government's authority to ―wind up‖ the wartime detention
and (2) that the District Court has the authority to order the
release of detainees into the U.S.33
At the outset of his decision, Judge Urbina acknowledged
that the ―government has absolved the petitioners‖ of their
enemy combatant status, and assuming that the ―petitioners
were lawfully detained,‖ that the Executive possessed some
inherent rights to ―wind up‖ detentions.34 ―Wind up‖
authority, in times of war, allows the Executive reasonable
time for the repatriation of Prisoners of War (hereinafter
―POWs‖).35 The District Court cited the framework for
indefinite detention laid out by Zadvydas36 and Martinez.37
These decisions reasoned that a removable alien is subject to
a presumptively lawful period of detention for six months.38
However, the District Court conceded that these cases were
not ―strictly analogous‖ to the instant case.39
In contrast, the government's position, as stated by the
District Court, was that POWs had been detained for years
32

Id. (citing See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n.7
(2005) ("[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.")).
33
Id. at 36-39, 43.
34
Id. at 36.
35
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
935637.
36
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
37
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
38
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
39
Id.
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after the cessation of hostilities and that the clock for these
detainees began to accrue from the time the government
abandoned its new CSRT.40 Furthermore, the government
looked at Mezei41 as controlling law. Here, the government
argued that Mezei was permanently excluded from entry into
the U.S., harbored on Ellis Island, and that no country was
willing to receive him.42 Further, the government emphasized
that the ―right to enter the United States depends on
congressional will, and the courts cannot substitute their
judgment for the legislative mandate.‖43
Judge Urbina disagreed that Mezei controlled since it was
never intended to decide matters of indefinite detention,
whereas, Zadvydas and Clark were specifically concerned
with this severe imposition. Consequently, the District Court
found that Mezei had been undermined by subsequent case
law and is distinguishable to the instant case because
petitioner was never aware of the evidence used against him
and came voluntarily to the U.S.44
Finally, in discussing the power to admit or exclude
aliens, the District Court readily conceded that ―the power to
expel or exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental sovereign attribute
. . . largely immune from judicial control.‖45 Yet, Judge
Urbina did not feel the language itself spoke in absolute
terms; and therefore, argued for governmental adherence to
procedural due process.46 Additionally, the District Court
found that the historical weight of precedent cut against
absolute deference.47 Thus, Judge Urbina concluded that the

40

Id. at 36-37 (The new CSRT was abandoned in August of 2009.).
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
42
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
935637 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207).
43
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 37
(quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216).
44
Id. (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208-09).
45
Id. at 40 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
46
Id. at 40.
47
Id. at 42.
41
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judicial branch had an obligation to intervene when so
required by the Constitution.48
B. Circuit Court (Judge Randolph Majority Opinion):
Response to District Court's Assertion Regarding the
Executive's Limited Right to Exclude
In reversing and remanding the District Court decision,
Circuit Court I held that the federal courts lacked the proper
authorization to review the Executive's exclusion decision.49
The majority relied on historical principles that guided
nation- states and immigration case law that made entrance of
aliens impermeable.50
First, Circuit Court I invoked the ancient Roman principle
that a ―nation-state has the inherent right to exclude or admit
foreigners and to prescribe applicable terms and conditions
for their exclusion or admission.‖51 This principle can be
found in Madison's reports during the Constitutional
Convention.52 Additionally, for more than a century, the
Supreme Court has recognized the sovereign right of the
political branches to exclude aliens beginning with the
Chinese Exclusion Case.53 Judge Randolph, who was part of
the majority in Circuit Court I, went on to quote Justice
Frankfurter's declaration that the rights of noncitizens rests
―wholly outside the concern and competence of the
Judiciary.‖54
The second argument presented by the Circuit Court I
attacks the basis for the District Court's reliance on Zadvydas
and Martinez while elevating Mezei, which the Court found
48

In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
935637.
49
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1029-1035 (2009), vacated,
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637.
50
See generally id.
51
Id. at 1025.
52
Id. at n.5.
53
Id. at 1025.
54
Id. at 1026.
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―analogous to [Kiyemba] . . . in several ways.‖55 As stated
previously, upon Mezei's return to the U.S., he was denied
entry at the border and efforts to resettle him elsewhere
failed.56 What the Circuit Court I gleaned from Mezei's ruling
was a rejection of the District Court's assertion that the
judiciary has the authority to release petitioners into the
U.S.57 In addition, the Circuit Court I found that Zadvydas
and Martinez dealt with interpretation of immigration laws
not the Constitution. Zadvydas was further distinguished
because it involved an alien who had already entered the
U.S.58 In sum, the Circuit Court I asserted that no habeas
court has ever, since Edward I, ―ordered such an
extraordinary remedy.‖59
IV. THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE & JUDICIAL AUTHORITY: THE
RIGHT TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE, THE RIGHT TO RELEASE OR
DETAIN
In assessing the arguments put forth by the District and
Circuit Court I, our analysis will be supplemented by
briefs/petitions submitted to the Circuit Court I & II and the
Supreme Court. The crux of the analysis will focus on the
major Supreme Court immigration cases that were heavily
relied upon by both the parties and the courts. Even with the
recent remand of the case to the Circuit Court II, if the Circuit
Court II finds that there is no impact regarding a detainee‘s
release into the U.S. because of his refusal to be exiled to a
foreign land, the subsequent analysis of immigration case law
remains highly relevant.

55

Kiyemba v. Obama 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (2009), vacated, 130
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637.
56
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 209
(1953).
57
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (2009), vacated, 130
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637.
58
Id. at 1028.
59
Id.; But see, Brief for Petitioner at 10, Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 085424 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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A. The Role of Immigration Law in Kiyemba v. Obama
In its opening brief to the Supreme Court, petitioners
asserted that although the government and the Circuit Court I
characterize petitioners' request for immigration relief; ―this
has never been an immigration case.‖60 This is what makes
the arguments on both sides so compelling. Nonetheless,
immigration law is integral to the disposition of the remanded
case. The most influential immigration cases in this litigation
are Mezei, Zydvdays, and Martinez.
1. Mezei
Both the Circuit Court I Majority in Kiyemba and the
government heavily relied on Mezei, a cold war case litigated
in the 1950s during both the Korean War and the McCarthy
era.61 According to the government, the case stood as
affirmation of the political branches supreme authority in the
area of foreign policy and immigration.62 Similar to the
Circuit Court I judgment, the court in Mezei had habeas
jurisdiction and held that any decision regarding the entry of
an alien belonged to the political branches of government and
not the judiciary.63 This rationale is crucial in the
Government's and Circuit Court's conclusion that the
detainees are not unlawfully detained but excluded from
entry. Consequently, their residence in Guantanamo Bay is
tantamount to ―harborage‖ similar to Mezei's situation at Ellis
Island.64 In validating this claim, the government pointed to
the current benign conditions of the detainees‘ residence65
60

Brief of Petitioners at 35, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 4709536.
61
Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at
4, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
4759115.
62
Brief for the Respondents at 13-16, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct.
458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 497333.
63
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1028 (2009), vacated, 130
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637.
64
Brief for the Respondents at 35-36, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct.
458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 497333.
65
Id. at 9.
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and their ability to leave Guantanamo Bay, if any country
was willing to take them.
Additionally, the Circuit Court draws a sharp distinction
between ―simple release,‖ release of aliens into the country of
their nationality/citizenship, versus release of aliens into the
territory of the U.S, which the Circuit Court I believed fell
outside the framework of immigration laws.66 This invariably
led to the question of whether ―petitioners have a
constitutional right to enter the United States . . . absent
compliance with, federal immigration laws.‖67 Both the
government and the Circuit Court I believed that well settled
precedent of ―an unbroken string of . . . decisions dating
back more than a century‖ forecloses such possibility.68
On the contrary, petitioners contended that the rationale
behind excluding Mezei was based on the government‘s fear
of foreign enemies dropping off potential spies to perform
espionage69 and then forcing the Executive to allow them
entry.70 Juxtaposing this rationale to the current situation
where petitioners are here only at the Executive‘s behest,
reveals two disparate factual scenarios. By equating the two,
Mezei would stand for the proposition that the ―Executive is
shielded from dilemmas of its own making.‖71 This is an
untenable position.
Furthermore, petitioners stated that their current detention
had no legal basis, whereas Mezei‘s exclusion was based on
statutory authorization.72 This is an important distinction
since petitioners sought no relief through immigration
66

Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1028 (2009), vacated, 130
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637; Munaf v. Geren, 128
S.Ct. 2207, 2221 (2008).
67
Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 13, Kiyemba v. Obama,
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 1526934.
68
Id. at 13-14.
69
Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at
11, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
4759115 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) (No. 139)).
70
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct.
458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 934097.
71
Id.
72
Id.
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mechanisms.73 Irrespective of this fact, the Kiyemba majority
(Circuit Court I) recast the discussion from a unilateral act of
Executive authority to petitioners seeking admission into the
U.S.74 Petitioners counter that there is no basis for
immigration law to be triggered since they neither applied for
immigration status nor sought entry at the border.75
2. Zadvydas & Martinez
If the Circuit Court I and the government are to be
successful in using Mezei as a sword of absolute authority, as
plenary power over immigration for the political branches,
they must first penetrate petitioners' shield in the form of
Zadvydas and Martinez.76 Petitioners forcefully argued that in
limited circumstances the ―right to release - even of
concededly undocumented aliens - has trumped the powers of
the political branches over immigration.‖ The principle that
arises from these two cases, and relied upon by Judge Urbina
in his decision is that a presumptive period of six months
detention is permitted.77 However, if after this period,
removal to another country is not ―reasonably foreseeable,‖
conditional release is the only remedy.78
In contrast, the government and the Circuit Court I argued
that Zadvydas, unlike petitioners, was living within the U.S.
as a lawful permanent resident at the time of his removal.79
Yet, they would have had difficulty escaping Martinez, where
the Court held that if detention became unlawful, even
inadmissible aliens who had been stopped at the border had a
right to be released into the U.S.80 Additionally, petitioners in
73

Id.
Id. at 24.
75
Id. at 25.
76
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001); Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371 (2005).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 17, Kiyemba v. Obama,
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 1526934.
80
Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU in Support of the Petition for
Certiorari at 8, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234),
2009 WL 1304719.
74
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Zadvydas and Martinez were ―adjudicated‖ as criminals and
conditional release was still upheld.81 However, the Zadvydas
Court proclaimed ―[n]either do we consider terrorism or other
special circumstances where special arguments might be
made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened
deference to the judgments of the political branches with
respect to matters of national security.‖82 Since petitioners in
Kiyemba are neither enemy combatants, terrorists, nor pose a
threat to our national security, they fall outside the
qualifications made in Zadvydas.83
B. Can Mezei, Zydvydas, and Martinez be Reconciled?
It is clear that two competing principles are at stake in
this discussion: The liberty interest of those who are
unlawfully detained versus the sovereign right of a nation to
exclude. At one end of the spectrum, applicants at the border
receive minimal constitutional guarantees. Yet, can we say
that those who have come involuntarily are applicants at the
border? It is easy to argue that a greater duty is owed to those
who have established permanent connections with the State,
and are therefore justified in receiving greater constitutional
protections. Nevertheless, in this scenario, what duty is owed
to those we have brought involuntarily to our borders, who
have no connections to the U.S., and who we have
imprisoned for over eight years? In fighting a war, must we
leave ourselves susceptible to inviting in those who for
various reasons may not be designated enemy combatants? In
the case of United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins,84 Judge
Swan seemingly answers these difficult questions and
81

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct.
458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 934097.
82
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
83
Brief of Petitioners at 36, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 4709536 ("The irony is that Petitioners
present no threat to anyone (demonstrated by the Executive's
encouragement of resettlement . . .), while the usual alien in this situation
has committed a crime of some kind.").
84
United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins, 163 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.
1947).
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poignantly denounces unchecked Executive authority, in the
context of World War II, when he states:
The theory that an alien can be seized on
foreign soil by armed forces of the United
States Navy, brought as a prisoner to our
shores, turned over to immigration authorities
as being an ―applicant for admission to the
United States,‖ held in custody by them for
nearly six years, and then deported to
[Norway] by virtue of exclusion order savors
of those very ideologies against which our
nation has just fought the greatest war of
history.85
In wrestling with these difficult questions, we evaluate
the arguments and themes which intersect with immigration
law and arose throughout the litigation proceedings. Briefly,
the note will examine: The Executive's ―wind up‖ authority,
―harborage‖, conditional release, and sovereignty.
1. ―Wind Up‖ Authority
Judge Urbina, in countering the government's assertions
regarding its ―wind up‖ authority, presented a three-part test
in determining its constitutionality. He succinctly explained
that the authority to ―wind up‖ ceases when: ―(1) detention
becomes effectively indefinite; (2) there is a reasonable
certainty that petitioner will not return to the battlefield to
fight against the U.S.; and (3) an alternative legal justification
has not been provided for continued detention.‖86 The District
Court reasoned that all three grounds have been met since the
government is unable to relocate petitioners, there is no
85

Brief of Petitioners at 39, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 4709536 (quoting Bradley, 163 F.2d at
332).
86
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL
935637.
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dispute regarding petitioner's lack of membership or
involvement with al Qaida or the Taliban, and that ―wind up‖
authority is an insufficient alternate legal justification for
continued detention.87 Thus, the District Court found the
government's continued detention of petitioners to be
unlawful.88
It is interesting that the Circuit Court I never considered
the arguments regarding ―wind up‖ authority, which were
raised by the government and answered by the District Court.
However, in the government's Opposition Brief to the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, it argued once again that the
Executive has wartime authority and cited historical cases.89
One case the government cited was the cease-fire in the
Korean War where approximately 100,000 Chinese and
North Koreans were held as POWs and were unable to return
to their home countries.90 Resettlement of these individuals
took over two years.91 The second case stems from the first
Persian Gulf War where ―[t]housands of Iraqis were detained
by the United States and its allies . . . because they refused to
be repatriated to their native country.‖92 Notably, there was
no mention of the time frame upon which it took to resettle
these POWs. The government believes that these examples
are dispositive of the U.S. right to ―house‖ detainees at
Guantanamo for a reasonable time until resettlement is
possible.93
In Judge Roger's concurring opinion, she pointed out that
the majority did not discuss the Executive's ―wind up‖
authority and notes that both the Geneva Conventions and
U.S. Army policy ―require repatriation of POWs without

87

In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
Id. at 39.
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Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 25, Kiyemba v. Obama,
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 1526934.
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delay.‖94 Moreover, she addressed the lack of specificity in
the government's period for holding the Iraqi detainees after
the cessation of hostilities. According to the Department of
Defense Report to Congress, over 80,000 POWs were
―repatriated or granted refugee status within Saudi Arabia
within six months.‖95
The problem with the government's argument is that these
―petitioners . . . have never been treated as POWs, have been
imprisoned . . . for over seven years, and . . . the Executive's
unsuccessful efforts to locate a suitable country for release
had been on-going for more than five years.‖96 Another
crucial distinction is the relative number of detainees in each
situation. There is no doubt that it would be nearly impossible
for the U.S. to absorb thousands of POWs, nor would it have
a duty to assume such a responsibility. Nevertheless, there are
only five petitioners remaining and such numbers do not
create an overwhelming logistical, cost, or security
dilemma.97 In responding to the government's argument,
petitioners plainly asserted that where the Executive may
need reasonable time to accommodate POWs, this concept
does not apply to civilians, and more importantly, whatever
―wind up‖ authority existed, ended with the decisions in
Zadvydas and Martinez.98
Finally, neither the government, nor the Circuit Court I,
discusses the possibility of conditional release and how that
may mitigate the government's concerns.
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Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1033 n.2 (2009), vacated, 130
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. (Rogers, J.,
concurring) (internal citation omitted).
95
Id.
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Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. ___(2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010)
(per curiam).
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Brief of Petitioners at 47, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 4709536 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 696 (2001); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005)).
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2. Conditional Release
There is limited discussion about what steps could be
taken to mitigate the concerns of the government in releasing
petitioners into the U.S. Soon after his decision, Judge Urbina
had scheduled a briefing with Homeland Security to discuss
the details of a conditional release.99 However, the Circuit
Court I granted an emergency stay of the proceeding pending
its resolution of the case.100 Judge Rogers briefly described
the ―detailed plan‖ as including: Help from organizations
such as the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, the
President of the World Uighur Congress, housing with
Uighur families, transportation, financial support and care.101
Nevertheless, Judge Urbina issued their immediate
release one week prior to consultation with Homeland
Security.102 The government raised a valid argument that it
should be given ―a full opportunity to present any relevant
information bearing on . . . the conditions of their release
before taking the drastic step of ordering petitioners brought
here.‖103 Frustrated by the Executive's delay tactics, Judge
Urbina was unwilling to concede any more time to the
government. Nonetheless, if the Circuit Court II on remand
does issue petitioners' release, the government should be
given a meaningful opportunity to present its arguments on
permissible restrictions.
In seeking to strike a balance between the relative
interests at stake, the Circuit Court II should also look at
Zadvydas' instruction pending mandated release where ―such
an order did not confer a legal right to ‗live at large‘ but
99

Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1034 (2009), vacated, 130
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637 (Rogers, J.,
concurring).
100
Id. at 1024 n.2.
101
Id. at 1034 n.2 (Rogers, J., concurring).
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Id. at 1034 (Rogers, J., concurring) ("The district court declined
to stay the proceedings, noting that petitioners had already been
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the Executive's litigation strategy.").
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merely a right to be ‗supervis[ed] under release conditions
that may not be violated.‘‖104 Moreover, our immigration
statute allows for noncitizens to be released into the U.S.
without conferring them any statutory rights.105 This
mechanism of being a ―parolee‖ should allay the concerns of
the government, since no legal status is conferred on the
aliens and their entrance into the U.S. ―shall not be regarded
as an admission of the alien.‖106 In weighing the interests at
stake, conditional release provides a modicum of fairness,
whereas, the government's concept of ―harborage‖ of
petitioners seems nebulous at best.
3. ―Harborage‖
In a bold assessment, the government contended that
petitioners were no longer detained and were currently being:
housed at Guantanamo pending the
identification of a third country where they
may resettle. Petitioners are being housed in
relatively unrestrictive conditions, given the
status of Guantanamo as a U.S. military base.
See J.A. 1246 & n.3 (describing conditions).
Petitioners are in special communal housing
with access to all areas of their camp,
including an outdoor recreation space and
picnic area. Petitioners sleep in an airconditioned bunk house, and have the use of
an activity room equipped with various
recreational items, including a television with
VCR and DVD players. Petitioners also have

104

Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU in Support of the Petition for
Certiorari at 12 n.5, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 081234), 2009 WL 1304719 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696
(2001) (citation omitted)).
105
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access to special food items, shower facilities,
and library materials.107
Even though petitioners' facilities have improved, they are
still surrounded by razor wire fences and armed guards.108
They have limited communication with the outside, and their
only visitors are their lawyers and the Red Cross.109 Even
Mezei had far more freedom, since he left by boat twice to
European countries that ultimately denied him.110 Logically,
―[a]s long as the prison gate is locked and the fence is
patrolled, the prisoners are not released.‖111
A compelling argument against ―harborage‖ is that
Mezei's situation was never termed a ―detention‖ by Justice
Clark, rather, the terms or euphemisms employed by the
government and the Circuit Court I such as: ―Harborage‖,
―temporary haven‖, and ―exclusion" serve as a crucial
distinction to Mezei's holding, ―and thus to the case's
precedential force.‖112
4. Sovereignty
Both the government and Circuit Court I lay forth a
plethora of case law supporting the Executive and
Congressional authority to exclude aliens from entry into the
U.S. Yet, they overlook a key question: Whether sovereignty
is maintained by keeping individuals stateless? Seemingly,
the war on terror may continue for a generation or longer. If
so, isn't the whole concept of sovereignty undermined by
potentially creating a class of stateless people? Here,
petitioners would likely be persecuted in their home country,
107
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are not given POW status, and if the government prevails
again at the Circuit Court II, it will be left with one final
chance to seek a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court
while having spent over a decade in detention.
Ultimately, the government must realize that this void, or
black hole, is mostly of its own doing. Although it continued
to make references to the petitioner's connections to al Qaida
or the Taliban through affiliations with Eastern Turkistan
Islamic Movement, both the District Court and Circuit Court
I seemed satisfied with the decision in Parhat, ―that the
government had not presented sufficient evidence that the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement was associated with al
Qaida or the Taliban, or had engaged in hostilities against the
United States.‖113 Thus, by penalizing those who are
unlawfully detained, especially where there is no
countervailing security threat, fundamental principles of
fairness and due process will inevitably be eroded. It is
crucial to remember Zadvydas' poignant assertion that the
political branches' plenary power is ―subject to important
constitutional limitations.‖114
The key distinction in this debate rests on the
voluntariness or involuntariness of the alien to find himself at
the threshold of the U.S. border. If the U.S. were compelled
to take enemy aliens entrenched at our gate, U.S. sovereignty
would be compromised. However, the compulsion here is
different. First, petitioners were brought to our border, then
their status was changed by the government to reflect that
they were no longer considered enemy combatants, and
finally, U.S. laws preclude the government from sending
petitioners to their home country for fear of torture or
mistreatment. There is no external force that compels us to
release petitioners into the U.S.; it is our own principle of
justice that mandates such release, and thus, our sovereignty
is preserved by the same laws which breathe life into its core.
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Though the government vigorously denies that Martinez
judicially compelled the release of these petitioners because it
is based on statutory construction; whenever a ―serious
constitutional threat is raised by reading a statute to permit
indefinite detention, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
applies.‖115 Therefore, since no express detention power
exists in the Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF), the
constitutional presumption in both Zadvydas and Martinez
regarding a six-month limit to detention should control.116
V. CONCLUSION
It is imperative to keep in mind that unchecked Executive
authority allowed for the use of indefinite detention during
the Alien Sedition Acts of 1798 and Japanese internment of
World War II.117 Each incident was given official sanction
because they were cloaked in the language of protecting
national security. These events serve as perpetual reminders
that tremendous caution must always be taken when
restricting liberty. Nevertheless, the world cannot continue to
be a repository for America's mistakes and miscalculations
when addressing the war on terror. The government needs to
find a mechanism that does not first designate individuals as
enemy combatants aligned with terrorists and then later seek
their removal hoping that other nations will willingly
embrace them.
In this scenario, where petitioners are not considered a
threat to the U.S., it behooves the U.S. government to take
responsibility for involuntarily bringing petitioners to the
threshold of our gates. How can the U.S. correct its mistake
of detaining those who have not been charged with a crime
for over eight years, if its only remedy is to keep them in the
same prison but with fewer restrictions? In the attempt to
analogize or distinguish the various immigration cases, the
115
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reasonable conclusion is that no case neatly resolves the
impasse.
Both parties have compelling support. However, without
recognizing that the Constitution permits some limitation on
the political branches, the result is an unfettered discretion
over the lives of unlawfully detained individuals. Ironically,
maintaining America's sovereignty leads to acts which erode
fairness and due process; the fundamentals on which that
sovereignty rests are themselves compromised. Even if the
government takes an uncompromising stand, society is
unlikely to tolerate such injustice; as was seen with Mezei
eventually being paroled into the country.118 Whereas Mezei
represents the high-water mark of governmental authority,
much criticism from both the judiciary and scholars has
substantially eroded its impact.119
There are potential alternatives to placate both parties.
One way is for the government to set terms for the condition
of petitioners' release and ―parole‖ them into the U.S. without
conferring any rights that ―accompany admission or entry.‖120
Even Mezei found that an individual paroled into the country
maintains the status as one ―on the threshold of initial
entry.‖121 This mechanism seems to ideally balance the
Separation of Powers Doctrine (balancing the individual
domains of the three branches of government) and elevates
petitioners' argument that Zadvydas and Martinez reject any
notion that releasing aliens into the U.S. exceeds judicial
authority. In the end, exclusion and detention need not go
together.122
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